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IN THE SUPREME COURT
·of the

STATE OF UTAH

LLOYD D. SUTTON, HARVEY L. ·
RANDALL, GALE V. BARNEY and
PAUL ANNELLA, a co-partnership,
doing business under the name and style
of BLFE FLA~1:E COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.NICK 1IARVIDIKIS, FAYE OLSEN,
CLARON GOLDING, :MALlO PECORELL!, FRANK SACCO, and .all others
engaged in the picketing of the coal mine
of the Blue Flame Coal Co.; and
UNITED ~TINE vVORKER~ OF
A1IERICA,
Defendants and Appellants. I

Case No.
8587

BRIEP OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

The parties will be referred to as they appe.ar below, the respondents herein being the plaintiffs and the
appellants, the defendants.
The figures in parentheses refer to the page number
of the Record.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about February 10, 1956, the coal mrnrng
property involved herein was operated by Walter Odendahl and Theron Odendahl, his son, under the firm name
and style of Star Point Coal Company (96-97). Said
company had only eight employees, including plaintiffs
Harvey L. Randall, Gale V. Barney, and Paul Annella
( 180). About said date, representatives of the employees contacted defendant Frank Sacco, then Vice
President of District 22, "LTnited :\line Workers of
America ( 177, 178) relative to fonning a local union
of said mine workers at said mine to improve wages,
hours, and working conditions thereat, and for other
benefits. Thereafter all said employees, including said
three plaintiffs Inet with the said Sacco and :\Ialio Pecorelli, international board men1ber of said union, and voted
unanimously to join said union, signed Inembership
application blanks for said purpose, and written authorization for payroll deductions of initiation fees and dues
(180, 181). Defendant Pe.corelli conununicated to said
\Valter Odendahl, the actions of said e1nployees (186).
Odendahl later told the said e1nployee8 there would not
he any jobs for thenl if they joined the rnited :\line
\Vorkers; that he would shut the 1nine down (269).
Pecorelli had suggested to Odendahl that he continue
operating the 1nine pending negotiations for a union
eontract (18G). He refused. He did not want thmn to
eome to work if they were going to belong to this union
( :2fl!)).
rrhere i ~ evidence that he coerced thr.ee employees
into terminating their employ1nent (199) and declined
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a written invitation to 1neet with the representatives of
said Union to bargain collectively for an employment
contract (147). The Odendahls subsequently completely
shut down said mine rather than to have the same
unionized.
On or about February 21, 1956, while said mine wa~
so shut down, plaintiffs Randall, Barney and Annella,
three of the eight employees who voted to join said union,
and plaintiff Sutton, obtained a lease of said mining
property from the Odendahls ( 96, 97) (149), and thereafter entered into a so-called partnership among themselves. (Ex. D). Substantial financial benefits were retained in said lease by the Odendahls (Ex. B). The
question asises as to whether said lease was bona fide
or shan1. It appears to defendants to be merely an attempt to circumvent .and evade the issues involved in s'aid
labor dispute, and to deny to the remaining five employees of Mr. Odendahl their rights under Section 7 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, and Sec. 34-1-7, U.C.A. 1953, and to
deprive them of their jobs n1erely because they sought to
organize a union at said mine, as well as to deny then1
the right to work under the provisions of the Utah Right
To Work Act si1nply because of union activities. The
said three former employees, who .are now plaintiffs, contributed none of the property used in the partnership
business and are allowed to withdraw the sum of about
$22.00 per day which is the equivalent of the prevailing
wage being paid to coal miners in Carbon County (133).
All of the plaintiffs well knew of said labor dispute involved at said mine .at the time said lease was made and
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3
entered into, and had full knowledge and notice that the
same was unresolved at said time. In fact, all of the
plaintiffs, except Mr. Sutton, by voting to join the union,
precipitated said labor dispute which continued under
the new owners, to-wit: the plaintiffs.
. .1\.fter
.
the plaintiffs leased the said mine from the
Odendahls as aforesaid, they did not attempt to contact
the defendants to settle said labor dispute. It was at
defendants' solicitation that Sutton, Sacco, and Pecorelli met. Very little took place at this first meeting (110) .
.Jfr. Sutton made no proposals. The second and last
rneeting was held also at the suggestion of the defendants.
One of the plaintiffs was absent therefrom (115). The
sarne was very brief. Plaintiffs asked what the
Union's proposal was with respect to settlement of
the labor dispute, and the defendants replied in substance
that defendants wanted the usual union contract ,,~hich
was in force with nearly all of the coal operators in
Carbon County and that said contract should embody
terms of seniority of mnployn1ent (114, 116). The meeting was friendly. There was no suggestion by anyone
that plaintiffs should not operate their rnine pending
negotiations for contract. Plaintiffs requested additional
tin1e to con~ider defendants· proposal and to confer with
the absent partner. The plaintiffs did not at said time
n1ake an~· counter proposal or engage in any detailed
di~em~~ion, u1ade no effort to cornpr01nise the differencBs
hehn'Pn the partie~, and the yer~· next day after the last
tlll'Ptinp; (Man·h 1) plaintiffs caused the trial court's
tt>1npora r~· rl'~training order to be ~erYed upon the det'nndants (1-t-, 15). Said restraining order was granted
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ex parte without hearing any evidence thereon by the
trial court and without compliance with any of the other
terms and conditions set forth in Sec. 34-1-28 U.C.A. 1953.
The five employees were never permitted to return to
their jobs .

.Moreover, the plaintiffs pursued the same antiunion policies as their immediate predecessors toward
said employees. It is defendants' position that by taking
over said mine while there 'vas .an unresolved labor dispute thereat, of which they had full knowledge and by
pursuing the sarne anti-union policies toward said five
employees as their predecessors, plaintiffs thereby
assumed and accepted said labor dispute. See National
Labor Relations Board v. New Madrid Manufacturing
Co., 215 F. 2nd 908; Regal J(nitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B. 324
U.S. 9, 65 S. Ct. 478; N.L.R.B. v. Atkins, 67 S. Ct. 1265,
331 E.S. 398.
Since said restraining order was granted, plaintiffs
have made no effort whatsoever to settle said labor dispute. Plaintiffs have been working said mine since lYiarch
1, 1956 under the protection of said temporary rest.aining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction, 'all of which enjoined all picketing, making no
distinction between peaceful or violent picketing (12, 32,
75). The restraining order was granted upon a bond of
$1,000 ( 12) and the prelin1inary injunetion upon a bond
of $2,000 (32) bo,th of which are grossly inadequate.
Defendants contend that there is a labor dispute existing in this case pursuant to Sec. 34-1-34, U.C.A. 1~53, 1and
within the definitions contained therein. Said picketing
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had comn1enced on or about February 23, 1956 insofar
as the same affeeted the plaintiffs, and continued to the
date of the service of said restraining order on March 1,
J 956 ( 229)' (14, 15).
The evidence shows that said picketing was established and maintained by defendants Faye Olsen and
Claron Golding, two of the original eight employees at
said mine (271). They were joined in this picketing by
persons sympathetic to them (191). Picketing was for
the purpose of protecting the jobs of the remaining five
e1nployees who continued their efforts to unionize the
1nine and exercise their rights under Sec. 7 of the TaftHartley Act, and Sec. 34-1-7, U.C.A. 1953 (227). The
picketing was not violent ( 235) and occurred on a public.
highway about seven 1niles from plaintiffs' 1nine (92).
Said picketing constituted an exercise of defendants' federal and state constitutional rights of free speech and was
for the purpose of acquainting the public and all people
who traveled along said highway that there was a labor
dispute in existence at said 1nine, the facts and circum:-;tances relative thereto, the issues involved and defendants' position in regard thereto, all in peaceful, orderly
and lawful manner. Another objectiYe of the pickets
wa~ to atten1pt to cause plaintiffs to reeonsider the action
of the three employees 'dw abandoned their fellow employP<'~ in the 1nid~t of their efforts to secure the benefits
of union organization at said 1nine, in direct violation
of thP agreement runong the eight en1ployees (:2:27) and
thu~ protect the johs of the re1naining five e1nployees
who had lost their jobs by reason of union activity.
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Defendants' position is that the s.aid picketing was
for lawful purpose·s. Even in the absence of an employeremployee relationship or labor dispute, peaceful picketing
for union purposes has been held lawful. See Cafeteria
Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126,
88 L. Ed. 58; D1~mmermuth v. Hykes, 95 N.E. 2nd 32;
Journeymen Tailors' Union v. Miller's, 312 U.S. 658, 61
S. Ct. 732, 85 L. Ed. 1106; AFL v. Swimg, 312 U.S. 321, 61
S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855; Jvlilk Wagon Drivers v. M eadou·moor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836;
Bakery & Pastry Drivers' Local v. Wold, 315 F.S. 769,
62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178.
There is .ample evidence supporting the position of
the defendants that no one was compelled to stop on said
highway and the traffic thereon was not blocked or inlpeded by said pickets and the latter did not interfere with
anyone who wished to travel said highway (234); that
said pickets did not intixnidate, thre.aten or coerce in any
manner, anyone who was traveling from said mine or
otherwise ( 234). The evidence is also to the effect that
plaintiffs were pennitted to go through the picket line
and were never compelled to turn back (234-5). Plaintiffs, however, did not cross the picket line on occasions
because they did not choose to do so or due to apprehension on their part as to what might happen and not
by reason of any conduct or acts on the part of the
pickets (123).
There is no evidence that the pickets at any time carried or concealed any weapons of any nature (120) or
that they stopped anyone from hauling co.al from said
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mine at any time. The said picketing took place for about
21j2 hours from February 23, 1956 to March 1, 1956, a
total period of six days ( 284). There is evidence that
the pickets were at the side of the road and not on the
highway and that they hailed passing motorists but did
not compel any motorist to stop; that they engaged in
peaceful and friendly conversation with those who did
stop (273).
The evidence further supports the proposition that
defendants Pecorelli and Sacco did not order, direct nor
control in any manner the said persons engaged in said
picketing, and did not .aid nor abet nor ratify the same.
The evidence does show, however, that those who established and maintained the picket line did from time to
time seek inforn1ation and advice from said two defendants (272), and in the course thereof defendants Pecorelli
and Sacco cautioned representatives of the pickets that
.all pieketing must be peaceful and orderly and there must
be no violence, intimidation, threats or similar conduct,
and that such precautionary 1ueasures are given to all
1nembers of the defendant ~line \Yorkers who are engaged in picketing, regardless of whether the organization itself or individual1uen1bers thereof established the
picket line. It is given out of .abundance of caution,
g<'Iwrally.
~rhr

1nain issue in thi8 case is whether or not the
trial eourt had jurisdiction under the facts and circum:'! a ll<'P~ herein to issue its pennanent injunction and that
<'V<'n if ~u<'h juril:'dirtion is assu1ned, whether or not the
law and evidenee hrrein "~.arranted the granting thereof.
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The said court's findings and permanent injunction indicate that the court believed and accepted all of the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses, but that it arbitrarily rejected the testimony of defendants and their witnesses.
It is very unusual for the truth to be all on one side ,and
for th~ opposite side to be entirely unworthy of belief.
The trial court was in error in issuing its permanent
injunCJtion herein for the reasons hereinabove and hereafter stated.
S~rATE~fEXT

OF POIXrrS ON APPEAL
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE UNDER
FEDERAL LAW.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE ITS PERMANENT INJUNCTION HEREIN UNDER STATE STATUTES.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE
PICKETING HEREIN FOR THE REASON THAT THE SAME
WAS NOT VIOLENT, BUT PEACEFUL AND FOR A LAWFUL PURPOSE.
POINT IV
PEACEFUL PICKE'TING IS THE LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PURPOSE THEREOF IS TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS WHO
OPERATE WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP TO JOIN UNION.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE UNDER
FEDERAL LAW.

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that with
respect to conduct proscribed under the Taft-Hartley
Act, this area is exclusively reserved to the Federal
Board, in the first instance, and thereafter to the Federal
Courts, and by reason thereof the area is closed to the
States. See Plankinton Packing Co. u. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S. Ct. 491
(1950), where the Court held in a per curiam opinion
that proscriptions of the Wisconsin Labor Relations statute of the same tenor as those in the Taft-Hartley Act
could not be enforced with reference to an employer over
which the National Labor Relations Board customarily
exercises jurisdiction.
The smne principle thus enunciated with reference
to employer unfair labor practices was carried over to
union unf.air labor practices in Garner v. Teamsters
Cnion, 346 U.S. 485, 7-l S. Ct.161 (1953).
In the Garner ease, supra. a labor union peacefully
picketed the pre1nises of an interstate trucking cmnpany
in Penn~~·h·.ania. The picketing allegedly had for its purpo~e thP unionization of the company's en1ployees. There
wa~ no ennt roYrrs~·, labor dispute or strike in progress,
and tlw company had not objected to their employees
joining tlw union. The e1nployer brought the suit. The
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State Court enjoined the picketing as being in violation
of the state labor relations act. The State Supreme Court
on appeal, although finding that the object of the picketing wa~ to force the employer to coerce its employees to
join the union, concluded that the "grievance fell within
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
to prevent unfair labor practices" and therefore state
remedies were precluded ( 373 P.a. 19, 94 A. 2d 893).
The F.S. Supreme Court upheld the State Aupreme
Court, stating:
"Congress has taken in hand this particular
type of controversy where it affects interstate
com1nerce. In language almost identical to parts
of the Pennsylvania statute, it has forbidden labor
unions to exert certain types of coercion on employees through the medium of the employer (citing 8 (b) 2 and 8 (a) (3), Taft-Hartley Act (346
U.S. at 488). Congress did not merely lay down
a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any
tribunal competent to apply law generally to the
parties. ***Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these
diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward
labor controversies."
Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that although
state regulation would merely duplicate federal regulation, it would constitute a source of conflict and diversity arising out of different procedures and attitudes.
Although the conduct in question may be fitted into the
category of an unfair labor practice, the State action
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is not automatically precluded if the unfair labor practice may constitute conduct historically subject to state
regulation and control.
Activities protected by the Taft-Hartley Act are contained in Sec. 7 of the Act, and fall outside the area over
which the State has authority to act. The U.S. Supreme
qourt, in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468,
resting on the pre-emption postulate of the pre-TaftHartley de·cision in Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945),
has declared that a State may not prohibit or condition
the exercise of rights which the federal act protects.
In Hill v. Florida, the state enjoined a labor union
from functioning until it had complied ·with certain statutory requirements. The injunction was invalidated on
the ground that the \r agner Act included a federally
established right to collective bargaining with which the
injunction conflicted. In B'US Employees v. Wisconsin
Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951), and Automobile Workers
v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. -±5-! (1950), the Court invalidated
state statutory strike procedures on this same general
ground. The activities in said cases were held to be in
conflict with, and a denial of, rights guaranteed under
Sec. 7 of the Taft-Hartley A.ct.
The N.L.R.B. has found the following to constitute
unfair labor practices within the Ineaning of Section 8
(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-IIartley Act: mass picketing,
obstruction of streets and highways so as to prevent ing-r<>~s to or egn'ss fr01n a plant. (Sunset Line and Twine
Co., 7!) N.L.R.B. 487, Sn1ith 1\Ifg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 886,
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 8-! N.L.R.B. 563, Irwin
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Lyons Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 54). It will be noted
that the court in its :B...,indings in the case at bar has
found that the picketing involved herein allegedly blocked
the highway leading to the mine of the plaintiffs (69).
Since the federal board has found thG-t this constitutes
an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act in the
cases cited immediately above, the sar11e would preclude
the trial court from awarding an injunction with respect
to said conduct. In l~nited Construction Workers ~·.
Lalmrmrm Constntction Corp., 347 r.S. 656 (1954), the
Supreme Court "assumed'' that the F nion's use of
threats of voilence on .a picket line to make employees
join the union was a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
of the Taft-Hartley Act.
In the case at bar if this Court finds that the picketing involved herein was violent, then the same would be
a violation of Sec. 8 (b) (1) (A) of the T.aft-Hartley Act
and the trial court had no jurisdiction thereof.
In Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed itself on pre-emption by saying
that duplicatory state procedures would be stricken down,
and then stated:
"The detailed prescription of a procedure for
restraint of specified types of picketing would
seem to imply that other picketing is to be free
of other methods .and sources of restraint. For
the policy of the National Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but
only that ascertained by its prescribed processes
to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise it is implicit in the act that the public interest is served by
freedom of labor to use the weapon of picketing.
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For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to
declare picketing free for purposes or by methods
which the federal Act prohibits.'' 346 U.S. at 499500.
The Court also said :
"A state may not enjoin under its own labor
statute conduct which has been made an unfair
labor practice under Federal statutes.''
In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, -1:81,
the Supre1ne Court divides the field of pre-emption into
two areas : proscribed and protected conduct. The Court
concludes:

"*** where the conduct if not prohibited by
the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come
within the protection afforded by that Act, the
state court must decline jurisdiction in deference
to the tribunal which Congress has selected for
determining such issues in the first instance."
The Court further held the pre-e1nption doctrine
applies even where picketing violated the anti-trust la-w
of .Jfissouri. (This was in direct conflict with Giboney
r. EmJrire Storaqe & Ice Co. (1949), 336 r.S. 490, 93 L.
11Jd. 834, 69 S. Ct. GS-t). The Court disposed of Giboney
and all prior decisions li1niting organizational picketing
hy saying:
"Tlw l\1 issouri c.ourt relied upon Giboney ***
for the proposition that a State Court retains
jurisdiction oYer this t~·pe of suit. But Giboney
\vas eoncerned solely with whether the ~tate's injunction ,against picl~eting violated the Fourteenth
.. \ mPndn1ent. No question of federal pre-e1nption
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
was before the court; accordingly it was not dealt
with in the opinion."
The U.N. f--iupreme Court in Capital Serz:ice, Inc. r.
N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501, held the Labor Board could obtain injunctive relief from federal courts to prevent enforeelnent of state court's injunction barring picketing.
in a dispute involving unfair labor practices under the
Taft-Hartley Aot.
~n

Since the five employees in the case at bar wert>
exercising rights guaranteed to thern under Sec. 7 of the
Taft-H.artley Act, (F.C.A. Title 29, Sec. 156) to-wit:
The right to self-organization to forn1, join or assist tlw
labor organization involved herein and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and s.aid rights under the federal decisions above
cited are protected activities; they are activities under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B., and state action to enjoin said activities is precluded by the federal
Act, unless the picketing is violent. The defendants contend that said picketing was not violent and is, therefore,
a protected activity under s.aid Taft-Hartley Act. For
this reason the trial court had no right to enjoin the smne.
Moreover, the V.S. Supreme Court held in N.L.R.B.
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, that where .any mnount of
goods crossed the state lines, whether directly or indirectly, interstate commerce is affected and the Board
(N.L.R.B.) has jurisdiction.
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In the case at b.ar it is admitted in the testimony of
Mr. Odendahl that approximately 40% of the output of
the coal at the mine involved herein found its way into
interstate commerce (295). ~ir. Sutton's testimony is
substantially to the .same effect (207), (208).
Defendants are aware that the Board itself ordinarily detennines its own jurisdictional standards on a
Inuch more restrictive basis than the holding of this case
and the Board can change those standards as it did during
1954. However, the court should determine whether or
not the Board has jurisdiction and the Board itself should
not be allowed to make this determination. In the case at
b.ar ·evidence lwas ;ffitroduced to the effect that the
~.L.R.B. had declined jurisdiction (330, 331). Under the
authority of the Fainblatt case, supra, the defendants are
not bound by such determjnation by the Board itself
and even though the Board declined jurisdiction herein
under said authority, it would have jurisdiction, since
40o/o of the output of said 1nine 'vent into interstate
<'Ommerce.
In the eyent of doubt as to whether or not the
would or would not haYe jurisdiction, it has
been held that the State Courts should not enjoin. See
State Labor Board r. TT'ags Transportation Co .. 26 L.C.
~.L.R.B.

fiS. 7:l-l-.

In Uuircrsal Car and Sen·icc Co. r. l.A.JI., :27 L.C.
fiS. S:2;\ tlw ~I iehigan Court held that the ~.L.R.B. had
juri~rliction

wlwther it accepted it or not and that the
~tat<- ronrt. thPrefore. could not enjoin even though
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str,anger picketing was involved and the stranger picketing was against the public policy of the state. Thereafter,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took the s.ame
position as the Michigan Court in the Universal Car case,
supra, citing with approval the Michigan Court's statement that jurisdiction must be based on ".actual jurisdiction'' of the Board, not on "day to day, or month to
month, discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the
Board." The Tenth Circuit Court further held that where
the Labor Board has jurisdiction, such jurisdiction cannot be vested or revested in a state court by the Board's
refusal to act. It can only be done by the Board's formally ceding jurisdiction pursuant to the requisite provisions of the Taft-llartley Act. See Retail Clerks v.
Your Food Stores, 225 F. 2nd 659, and Food Basket, Inc.
c. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Kentucky Circuit Court,
29 L.C. 69, 561.
It is, therefore, sub1nitted that under the pre-emption
doctrine and also under the interstate commerce doctrine,
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction in this case and that jurisdiction herein w.as
vested in the National Labor Relations Board under ,the
Taft-HarUey Act and the federal decisions cited above.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE ITS PERMANENT INJUNCTION HEREIN UNDER STATE STATUTES.

The permanent jnjunction granted by the trial court
under the facts and cjrcumst.ances of this case is proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hibited under the s~tatutes of the State of Utah. The trial
court did not have jurisdiction to grant the same thereunder.
Sec. 34-1-25, U.C.A. 1953, provides, as far as applicable herein, as follows:
"No Court, nor any judge or judges thereof,
shall have jurisdiction to issue any*** permanent
injunction which in specific or in general tenns
prohibits any person or persons from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts: *** (b) becoming or remaining a member
of any labor organization or any employer organization, *** (e) Giving publicity to and obtaining
or communicating information regarding the existence of, or the fact involved in, any dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any
public street or any place where any person or
persons may lawfully be, without intimidation or
coercion, or by any other method not involving
fraud, violence, breach of the peace, or threat
thereof, *** (k) Doing in coneert any or all of the
acts heretofore specified on the ground that the
persons engaged therein constitute an unlawful
combination or conspiracy."
The Court's injunction in the case at bar does violence to said statute. lTnder said Section the defendants
had a right to be upon said highway leading to plaintiffs'
mine, to give publicity to and to cmnn1unicate information regarding the existence of or the fact involved in the
labor dispute herein, and could patrol said high,Yay and
Pngag<' in peaeeful eonYersation with p.assers-by thereon.
TJH' :-;weeping tenus of the Courfs injunction prohibited
tlH'lll frmn exercising these rights, since it restrained
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all picketing, which would include peaceful picketing
"·hich would prevent defendants from giving publicit~·
to and obtaining or connnunicating infonnation regarding the existence of, or the fact involved in, any dispute
by advertising, speaking, patrolling the public highway
involved herein, e~tc. The trial court's injunction issued
herein w.as therefore contrary to the rights granted by
the provisions of this section which is one of the labor
law:;: of the State of Utah.

,.

Section 34-1-28, U.C.A. 1953, provides, as far as applieable herein, as follows:
"No court nor any judge or judges thereof
shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined,
except after hearing the testimony of witnesse~
in open court ***, and except after findings of
all the following facts by the court or judge or
judges thereof: (a) that unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed and will be executed or
continued unless restrained; (b) that substantial
.and irreparable injury to complainants' property
will follow unless the relief requested is granted;
(c) that as to each item of relief granted greater
injury will be inflicted upon cmnplainant by the
denial thereof than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting thereof; (d) that no item of
relief granted is relief that a court or judge thereof has no jurisdiction to restrain or enjoin under
Section 34-1-25; (e) that complainant has no adequate remedy at law; (f) that the public officers
charged with the duty to protect complainant's
property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection.'" (1\Iy emphasis.)
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I e1nphasize that said section provides that all of the
facts therein enumerated must be found by the court before it has jurisdiction to issue an injunction. One of the
facts enumerated i.s in subdivision (c) of said section,
which provides that the court must find before granting
the injunction that as to each item of relief granted,
greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the
denial thereof than will be inflicted upon defendants by
the granting thereof. The court made no such finding
prior to granting the permanent injunction. Another
fact enun1erated is in subdivision (f) which reads: "that
the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish
adequate protection." The court did not make such a
finding herein, and under the evidence it could not have
done so. The testimony of Deputy Sheriff Charles Semken is to the effect that the Sheriff's Office of Carbon
County was able to give such protection and that l\Ir.
Sutton, one of the plaintiffs, ·was to notify said Sheriff's
Office if any trouble developed (289). His testimony is
that no call ,yas received by hun or to his knowledge at
said Sheriff's Office of any trouble at said picket line
( 290). ~ o testilnony was offered by the plaintiffs upon
which the eourt could base a finding a8 required by subdivision (f).
rrhe Court, having failed to find on two of the
grounds set forth in said section, and since by the e:s.prrss provisions thereof. it un1st find all of the said
facts in said sec.tion or is prohibited fron1 issuing an injunction in the easP, it is respectfully subn1itted the eourt
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by reason of its failure to so find committed error 1n
issuing the permanent injunction.
The defendants subrnit further that the plaintiffs
failed to make a reasonable effort to settle the labor dispute involved herein either by negotiation or otherwise, and for this reason the court was not authorized
pursuant to section 34-1-29, U.C.A. 1963, from granting
plaintiffs' injunctive relief.
Section 3-l:-1-30 U.C.A. 1953, provides, in part, as
foJlows:

"*** and every restraining order or injunction granted in a case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition
of such specific act or acts as rnay be expressly
cmnplained of in the bill of complaint or petition
filed in such case and expressly included in said
findings of fact made and filed by the court as
provided herein; ***"
The trial court's pennanent injunction herein provided, among other things:
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed
that the defendants, '!.<**, and all persons in active
concert or p.articipation with them, he, and they
are hereby, permanently restrained and enjoined,
from all picketing of said coal mine on what is
commonly known as the 'Air Port Road,' or the
approaches thereto, leading to plaintiffs' mine in
what is commonly known as 'Dead Man Canyon'
(75). ***" (My emphasis.)
Thereafter certain specific acts are enjoined (75).
We submit that when the court restrains "all picketing," the enjoining of other specific acts thereafter is
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1nere surplusage. The forbidding of "all picketing," of
necessity, includes the forbidding of peaceful picketing,
which the eourt has no right to restrain. We do not know
of any statute or decision of this court authorizing the
prohibition of peaceful picketing.
Section 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953, defines a labor dispute.
Section 34-2-5 U.C.A. 1953 provides in part, as follows:
"No such restraining order or injunction
shall prohibit any person or per.Sons whether acting singly or in concert, *** from attending at any
place where such a person or persons mBy lawfully be for the purpose of peaceably obtaining or
communicating information, or from peaceably
pursuading any person to work or to abstain from
working; or fron1 ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute; *** or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner and for lawful purpo~Ses; ***"
Section 34-16-6 U.C.A. 1953, which is a provision
of the Ftah Right to \\"'ork Law, provides as follows:
··Any person, finn, association, corporation,
labor union, labor organization or any other type
of association engaging in lockouts, layoffs, boycotts, picketing, work stoppages, or other conduct,
a purpose of \Yhieh is to c01npel or forc.e any other
1wr~on, finn, association, corporation. labor union.
labor organization or .any other type of association to violate any provision of this art shall be
guilty of illegal conduct contrar~- to public policy;
provided that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to preYent or n1a.ke illegal the peaceful
and orderl~· solicitation and persuasion by menlber~ of a labor union, labor organization or any
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other type of association of others to join a labor
union, labor organization or any other type of
association, unac0ompanied by any intimidation,
use of force, threat of use of force, reprisal, or
threat of reprisal."
It will be noted that the provision cited from the
Utah Right to \York Act (34-16-6) expressly states that
nothing in said provision shall be construed to prevent
or make illegal the peaceful and orderly solicitation and
persuasion by members of a labor union, labor organization or any other type of association of others, to join
a labor union, labor organization or any other type of
association, unacc01npanied by any intimidation, use
of force, etc. Therefore, even the Utah Right to Work
Act upon which plaintiff's action is allegedly predicated,
expressly exempts peaceful and orderly solicitation and
persuasion by members of a labor union to induce others
to join a labor union or si1nilar organization. However,
the forbidding of all picketing, which of necessity would
include peaceful persuasion or solicitation, by the trial
court in his injunction in the case at bar, is in direct
conflict with the Utah Right to Work Act, .and the express
provision cited above, and is therefore contrary to this
statute of the State of Utah.
The permanent injunction of the trial court in the
case at bar makes no distinction between peaceful picketing, peaceful persuasion, lawful patrolling of the highway, and unlawful conduct. It prohibits all peaceful,
as well as, unlawful conduct. It cannot be sustained under the express provisions of the labor statutes of this
state heretofore cited. Therefore, under said statutes,
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the trial court committed error in issuing the permanent
injunction herein prohibiting all picketing, peaceful or
otherwise.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE
PICKETING HEREIN FOR THE REASON THAT THE SAME
WAS NOT VIOLENT, BUT PEACEFUL AND FOR A LAWFUL PURPOSE.

The defendants submit that under the evidence the
picketing conducted by them was not violent, but was
peaceful and lawful. Of course, the trial court, following its usual pattern in this case, disregarded all of the
evidence of the defendants and gave credence to the
plaintiffs' testimony in toto. However, even under the
plaintiffs' testimony, the picketing herein was not of
the type which should have been enjoined.
The specific acts found by the court upon which it
is sought to justify the injunction appear to the defendants to be as follows:
1. That said pickets can1e out across the road leading to plaintiffs' coal mine and that plaintiff Sutton and
Frank Steininger, an independent truck driver, either
had to stop their respective vehicles or run over said
piclwt~

(69).

~-

That said pickets infonned said Steininger as
followt-': .. You hadn't better go up there," (from which
languagP the court per1nitted hilnself to jump to the far
fetehPd <'Onelnt-'ion that if said truck drjyer did proceed
t.hP piekets would inflict or cause to be inflicted on said
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driver, or his vehicle, great and .serious dmnage) (69, 70).
3. That a picket infonned Lloyd Sutton, one of the
plaintiffs, as follows : "vVe had orders to come up here
and stop you," .and that when Sutton told the picket that
if it was necessary he would get the Sheriff to come up
to the Inine, the picket said : "vVell, you better go get
him" (70).
4. That a bridge across the only road leading to
plaintiffs' mine was blown out during the picketing, and
the road strewn with roofing nails (70). (It is significant
that the court did not find who was responsible for this
eonduct.)
5. That on i\1arch 19, 1956 (19 days after the picketing wholly ceased), Faye Olsen, one of the above named
defendants, shot and damaged the truck of Harvey L.
Randall, one of the plaintiffs, .and the truck of said Steininger (70). I will tre.a t these findings in the same
order as they appear above.
1. As to the blocking of the highway by the pickets,
plaintiff Sutton himself testified that on February 23rd,
the pickets had their cars parked to the side of the ro.ad
and had a fire going there (101). He later stated that
they carne out across the road and "we either had to stop
or run over the1n" (102) . .Mr. Sutton testified that he
was preceded by .a trucker, to-wit: Frank Steininger, on
this particular occasion (103). 1\fr. Steininger testified
he went up to the picket line on the 22nd day of February
(21:)), but later testified that he did not know whether it
was the 22nd or :2:~rd of February (219). l-Ie further
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stated that when he first saw the pickets as he proceeded
toward the mine, they were right along the side of the
road ( 215), and that the road was clear ( 219). He was not
even hailed by the pickets (219). Both Mr. Sutton and
J\1r. Steininger were apparently talking about the same
day.
Claron Golding, one of the defendants who had initiated the picketing and who was at the picket line every
day while the same was in progress, stated that he did
not observe any of the pickets getting into the road and
stopping trucks or other vehicles (231). As to February
23, 1956, he testified that the plaintiffs came up in two
separate trucks about 7:30 A.~I. and that the pickets
were all on the side of the road by the fire and the plaintiffs just pulled up. He stated they pulled right over
within three feet of the edge of that road and the pickets
talked to then1 opposite the driver's sid~ (231).
Defendant Kick ~Iarvidikis was on the picket line on
February 2-±th and also February 27th (249). He was
asked if on the days he was on the picket line
whether he got out in the road to stop any cars or trucks
or otherwise and stated that he did not. He further testified that he did not see anyone else do so: that he did not
~PP anybody stand in the ro.ad and that he saw vehicles
pa~~ up and down the road without being stopped; that
thP piekd~ \H'l'P rig-ht at the edge of the pave1nent (251).

"r

Clayton
orthPn, an in1partial witness, who hapJH'TIP<l to pa:-;~ on the higlnn1~· during the picketing, but
rould not gin' the (_}xaet date, stated that he observed .a
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group of fellows who had a bonfire at the end of the
oil road and that these 1nen were to the side of the road,
the east side. They were standing around talking as far
as he could see, standing .around the fire ( 324). He further testified he did not observe any men on the highway.
On his way back, he stopped of his own accord and made
son1e remark to the men that it was pretty cold weather
to be out "picnicing" (325).
Joe C. Lopez, one of the pickets, also testified. that
the men were by the fire and that no body was on the
highway .at any time when he was there (343). :Mr. Lopez
further testified that the pickets did not stop Mr. Steininger, but that he stopped by himself (343). He further
stated that when Mr. Steininger stopped, two of the men,
he and Mr. i\farvidikis, went over ·to the truck. The other
men stayed by the fire ( 344) .
Williain Beveridge, who was on the picket line February 23rd about 8 :00 A.l\I. testified that no one stopped
either j[r. Steininger on 1!-,ebruary 23rd or Jack (Lloyd)
Sutton, (one of the plaintiffs). He stated the latter
stopped hi1nself ( 365).
\Yilliam R. Ward, another member of the picket line,
testified that he was on the picket line February 23rd
and February 24th and that when Sutton came up on
February 23rd the pickets were not on the highway .and
that no one flagged J\tir. Sutton; that Sutton stopped
(368).
In view of the conflict in the testimony of J\fr. Sutton and l\1 r. Steininger regarding where the pickets were
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on February 23rd, Mr. Sutton stating they came on the
road and Mr. Steininger stating that they were along
the side of the road and the overwhelming evidence on
the part of the defendants' witnesses to the effect that
the pickets did not stand on the road or block the traffic
but cmne over after Mr. Sutton stopped voluntarily, it
is defendants' contention that the court should have
found that the said pickets did not block or impede
traffic on said highway but that they were around the
bonfire on the east side of the road. The evidence does
not sustain the finding of the court and he had no reason
whatsoever to disbelieve the numerous "'1-ritnesses produced by the defendants, since their testimon~T was not
broken down .and there was no evidence assailing their
veracity; under the circun1stances the court's finding
that the pickets were on the highway was arbitrary and
unjustified.
2. Although plaintiff Sutton testified that he sent
~1r. Steininger to the 1nine on February 23rd but told
him if there was a picket line that he was to turn back
and ~[r. Steininger ad1nitted on cross-exan1ination that
Mr. Sutton had requested that he go to the n1ine on said
occasion, the court found that the pickets informed l\fr.
HtPininger, "You hadn't better go up there.'' The court
was not justified in finding that these words, standing
alone, n1eant that if the truck driver did proceed the
pi<'k<'t~ would inflict, or c.ause to be inflicted, upon said
driver or hi:-~ vehicle, great and serious drunage (69-70).
The ~aid trn<'k driYPr wa:-~ already under orders from
plaintiff Sutton to turn back if there was a picket line
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at the road. There is no evidence that said words allegedly spoken by the pickets were spoken in anger, or in
a thre.atening manner, or that they carried the threat of
imminent danger if the truck driver proceeded. If
spoken, they could well have meant that it would be
better for all concerned if the truck driver did not proceed to ,the mine. The evidence does not disclose the tone
of voice in which the words were uttered, if at all, or
whether they were accompanied by any overt act, indicating that force would be used if the trucker proceeded.
An attorney n1ay advise his client that he had not
better eng.age in certain conduct. This does not imply
necessarily that force or violence will be visited upon the
client if he acts contrary to the advice of his attorney.
Of course, defendants' evidence gives a different
version of the words spoken to the truck driver on said
occasion .
•Joe C. Lopez, one of the pickets, testified that the
conversation with the said truck driver was as follows:
"A.

Well, all he said, that he wanted to go up.
That that was the w.ay he was making his
living. And our answer was that we was
making our living by joining the union. That's
all we said. But we didn't stop him. So he
turned back." ( 345).
}f r. Lopez testified further:

"Q. Did either you or Mr. 1\iarvidikis say anything to him about not being able to go up
to the mine or where he was going~
A. ·we never did." (345).
Of course, sinee 1\lr. Steininger was told by Sutton to
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return if there
turned back by
only ~fr. Lopez
inger and that

was a picket line. He could well havC'
reason thereof. The record shows that
and Mr. Marvidikis spoke to 1\fr. Steinthe other pickets remained by the fire

(344).

3. As to the court's finding that a picket informed
Lloyd Sutton, one of the plaintiffs, as follows: "We had
orders to come up here and stop you,'' and that when
Sutton told the picket that if it was necessary he would
get the Sheriff to come up to the mine, the picket said:
"\Veil, you better go get hUn" (70). This language was
allegedly spoken to l\Ir. Sutton on Februa:r:y 2/ (110-111112). Later that day plaintiff Sutton and other plaintiff~
proceeded to said 1nine (112). Again the alleged stateInents above, if spoken, do not necessarily mean that forre
and violence would be inflicted upon ~Ir. Sutton or any of
the other plaintiffs if the picket line ·were crossed. There
was no threat that ~lr. Sutton was to be stopped by the
use of force or violence. rrhe pickets could well have
n1eant by said words, standing alone, that they had orders
to stop :Mr. Sutton by use of lawful1neans, to-"it: peaceful persuasion. l\f r. Sutton was told he could get the
Sheriff which is not consistent with the theory that force
wa~ to be inflicted upon him.
Again, we direct this Courfs attention to defendanb' evidence as to the said conversation with :Mr.
Hutton. Joe C. Lopez testified as follows:
Did von have a conversation with these two
1nen ·in the pick-up f (Sutton was one of the
men in the pick-up.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A_.

(~.

A.

Q.
A.

Well he can1e up to us and he said, 'Are you
going to let me through?' He said.
Now who said that?
That second fellow, what's his name?
:Mr. Sutton?
Yes. And right away he s.aid 'If you don't
I will just go get the law and go up.' We
said 'Suit yourself.' He turned back. I don't
know whether he came back all the way down
to Price or not but he turned right back, I
believe in about 20 minutes. He said, 'This
time I got orders to go up.'
Now just a minute. He went down, you don't
know where, but he came back, you say, in
about 20 minut·es?
Yes. And he said he had orders to go up .and
see the property. Our answer was, 6 You could
have went up in the first place.' We didn't
stop nobody. See. That's all that was said.
And what did he do then?
He went right up." (347-348).

Lopez' testimony seems fair and logical and the evidence shows :J[r. Sutton did go up to the rnine without
getting the sheriff and without any violence when he returned within .about 20 rninutes after the first conversation. If the pickets really said they had orders to stop
hj1u, why would they let him go through after he turned
back and then returned? Is it not more logical to believe
that because of J\ir. Sutton's apprehension of picketing
in general, (hereafter discussed), he was :->i1nply taking
rxtra precautions by stating that he would get the sheriff1 It is not clear where he went but he returned in 20
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minutes .and said that he had orders to go through. He
did not say from whon1 he received said orders and it
does not appear that he was fearful of not being let
through because he could have brought the sheriff to the
picket line but did not do so and yet he was allowed to go
through without any threats or violence of any kind.
I cannot refrain from pointing out, however that the
trial court, following its usual pattern throughout this
case, accepts fully the testimony of the plaintiffs and
without any cogent reason, rejects arbitrarily all of the
testimony of the defendants. In the opinion of the defendants, the three findings set forth above were the only
findings upon which the injunction could possibly be
based, because they are the only occurrences which plaintiffs allege and which the court found occurred at the
picket line. The other two findings did not occur at the
picket line.
4. The fourth specific finding was that a bridge
across the only road leading to plaintiffs' mine wa8 blm\'11
out during the picketing, and the road stre·wn ,,~ith roofing nails. It will be noted that the court did not make
any finding as to who was responsible for said acts.
There was evidence to the effect th.at a bridge on the road
leading to plaintiffs' 1nine was partially damaged and
~omeone had put roofing nails on the road (10-±). Xo one
know~ who committed these acts. Xo proof whatsoeYer
wa:-; ~nlnnittPd which connected or tended to connect the
dPI'<>ndants, or Pither of them, with the co1n1nission thereof. Deput:'T ~lwriff Se1nken testified he 1nade a thorough
i1nrp:-;t igat ion in .an effort to detennine who the guilty
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person, or persons, were, but was unable to do so (292).
:Mr. Sutton testified that if he knew who the· persons
where who committed said acts he would have them
prosecuted ( 130). :Moreover, the pleadings of plaintiffs
indicate they do not know who committed said acts. In
the first complaint they were content to allege that
"Plaintiffs believe, .and therefore allege, that the Defendants are responsible for said destruction and malicious
conduct ***" (2). (2\iy emphasis). After the court
ordered said allegation stricken ( 45-46), the plaintiffs
in their arnended complaint allege "That a bridge across
the only road leading to plaintiffs' mine was blown out
and the road strewn with tacks and nails and that plaintiffs are informed and believe and upon such information and belief, allege that the defendants are responsible
for said destruction, malicious conduct and intimidation."
(49). No proof was introduced whatsoever to show the
responsibility for s.aid acts. The defendants allege that
said finding should not have been made because it does
not connect the defendants with the acts alleged and it is
highly prejudicial and unfair to the defendants. It is
irrelevant because it is not and cannot be connected with
the defendants, or any of them. If we wish to indulge
in theory it is equally plausible to charge that the plaintiffs committed said acts in order to be able to make a
showing for an injunction -- an injunction which they
desperately wanted. There is evidence that Mr. Sutton
was at the mine at about 10 :00 P.M. the evening before
the said tacks were found and said bridge partially damaged (288). However, courts are not interested in theory
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but in cornpetent proof. Since there is no proof whatsoever in the record that defendants were responsible for
said aets, the trial court should not have considered the
san1e as constituting any basis upon which an injunction
should have been issued .and said finding is immaterial
in this case. The presumption of innocence, we take it,
still prevails in this jurisdiction.
5. The court found that on ~larch 19, 1956 (19 days
after the picketing wholly ceased), Faye Olsen, one of the
above named defedants, shot and damaged the truck of
Harvey L. Randall, one of the plaintiffs, and the truck
of ~Ir. Steininger. In desperation to show smne act of
violence upon which to base the injunction herein, the
plaintiffs of-fered and the court received, over the objection of the defendants, evidence to the effect that on
March 19, 1956, Faye Olsen~ one of the defendants shot
and damaged the truck of Harvey L. Randall, one of the
plaintiffs and the truck of ~Ir. Steininger. This event
occurred 19 days after the picketing had wholly terminated and 7 days after the court granted the prPliminary
injunction herein. The evidenee concerning :Jfr. Olsen
was to the effect that he had been drinking considerably~
that he was .ang-ry about the loss of his job; and that he
committed thi~ act without any suggestion frmn the other
defendant~. In otherwords. he was on a ··lark .. of his
own, although he had defendant Golding take hiin to
where the trucks were (388-9).
Defendants urge that this isolated act on the part of
FaYP
. Ol~0n. 19 days
. after the picketing had ceased, has
no <'onn<>etion with the other defendants. See N.L.R.B.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

u. Deena Artu·ear, 198 JJ•. 2nd 645, which held that unauthorized acts of violence by some of the striking employees during picketing are not chargeable to the other
members of the labor union representing the employees.
Therefore, this act had nothing to do with the other
members of the picket line and c.annot be chargeable to
them. Furtherrnore, this isolated act on the part of l\f r.
Olsen was entirely outside the issues of this case and,
therefore, ilmnaterial. rrhe plaintiffs had the opportunity
to amend their pleadings to include this matter but chose
not to do so. It is outside the issues as framed. Defendants insist it was error on the p.art of the court to admit
this evidence since it was not covered by the pleadings
and defendants were not apprized of the same beforehand. Further, it had nothing to do with the picketing
\vhich had ended some 19 days before. It does not cast
any light as to whether the picketing which took place
frmn February 23, 1956 to l\1arch 1, 1956 w.as peaceful
or otherwise. rrhere was no picket line in existence at the
time of this isolated act on the part of :Mr. Olsen. He was
acting entirely on his own initiative. Defendants direct
the court's attention to the case entitled Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, supra, in which the U. S. Supre Court (after citing the ~feadowmoor ca.se, supra,
to the effect that "***Right to free speech in the future
eannot be forfeited because of dissociated acts of past
violence"), said:
"Still less can the right to picket itself be
taken away merely because there may have been
isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring in the cour:se of that picketing."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
Defendants take the position that all of the alleged
words and acts specified above are isolated incidents and
do not justify the injunction issued in this case. There
is no causal connection between the isolated act of Faye
Olsen and said picketing. Since it occurred after the
preliminary injunction was granted the proper remedy
for the court to have applied was a citation against Mr.
Olsen for contempt. This would be consistent \\'"ith the
authorities cited. Said act cannot be chargeable to other
members on the picket line. See 1\".L.R.B. r. Deena
Artu·ear, supra.
The evidence shows that the real basis for this
action was not the alleged abuses of the picketing herein,
which are not sustained, hut rather plaintiffs' and Odelldahl's inherent fear of picketing in general, even though
it \\'"as peaceful.
It is clear from the record that neither

'yalter

Odendahl nor the plaintiffs intended to cross the picket
line. Both intended to respect it (1±6, 380) . .2\Ir. Odelldahl, when first advised by his e1nployees that a picket
1ine wa~ <'~ ta blished suggPsted. "that they do not attempt
to go through the picket line. I told then1 that I wanted
no trouble whatsopyer." (1±6). :Jlr. Odendahl abo testifi<>d that the mine would be shut down eon1pletely if the
union engaged in picketing (156). :Jir. Randall. one of
t liP plaintiffs. called "Talter Odendahl h~'" telephone after
find oh~<>rYing the picket line and before he went down
to it. He told l\f r. Odendahl ·· * •• they had a picket line
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out .and we would not go through and he told us not to
because he didn't want no trouble" (166).
Plaintiff Sutton testified that he intended to respect
the picket line ( 380). He told Deputy Sheriff Semken
that he was not going to run coal until the trouble was
settled (289, 380). Sutton was also asked:
"Q.

A.

Regardless of the reason, again Mr. Sutton,
you did not contemplate hauling any coal on
that highway while the picket line was there~
Yes or no.

No." (382).

Plaintiff Sutton further testified that none of the
defendants made any threats against him of any kind
(120). He was later asked:

"Q.

'Vell, Lloyd, all I want to know is by either
words or conduct did any of those pickets
actually threaten you with any type of violence, bodily hann, reprisals, threat of reprisals or anything else if you went through~

A.

They didn't threaten me bodily, no. But I
didn't know if they would or if they wouldn't."
(122).

Sutton further testified that his men (the other
als~f

fe)yi:
~. ODi'

we ~lti
nl a~~
kel~i

plaintiffs) had no trouble getting through the picket
line to his knowledge (123). In fact, there is no evjdence
that the plaintiffs were ever deprived of the right of
passage whether going to the mine or returning therefrom.
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A fair interpretation of the above testinwny in
defendants' view is that the very pres8nce of the picket
line served as a restraint even though no threats of
violence were made, but plaintiffs thought if they hauled
coal there could be trouble. In other words, Odendahl
and the plaintiffs assumed there could be violence if
they hauled coal and their assumptions did not arise
out of any \Vords or conduct of the pickets, but because
of some unpleasant experienc-es they had had in years
pa~t under unknown conditions with other persons. The
evidence sustains this proposition. When :\Ir. Odendahl
wa~ asked if the plaintiffs could not continue to haul
coal to the railroad cars (i.e., from the mine to the railroad cars at Price, F tah) under peaceful picketing, hi8
answer was, ''\Ye never know when picketing is peaceful or unpeaceful" (155 ). He went on to say that trucks
have been rocked until they have been upset (in the past)
and if he was a truck driver he would hesitate before
ero~~ing a picket line (155). This testimony was concerning past experience with other pickets, under other
ei n·mn~tances. His fears did not grow out of any words
or ads on the part of those defendants who served on
the picket line, but rather out of acts of other people at
different tinws and places and under circun1stances \Yith
whi<'h we .are not acquainted. It \\'ould he fair to 8ay that
he wa~ apprehensive of picket lines in general. There is
no ·evidence fr01n l\lr. Odendahl that this particular picket
line threatened hiln or his en1ployees in any Inanner what~OPYf'r.

or that the picketing herein was other than peace-

ful and orderly. He had instructed

hi~

Inen not to go
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through this picket line when it was first discovered.
Therefore, nothing which the pickets may have said or
done caused him to lease his mine to the plaintiffs, but
rather his inherent fear of picket lines in general. He
does not make any distinction between peaceful picketing
or violent picketing, contending that he does not know
when picketing is peaceful or "unpeaceful." However,
the law does take cognizance of and sanctions peaceful
picketing.
Plaintiff Sutton testified that he was not threatened
with bodily injury by the pickets as aforesaid (122). He
added significantly that he "wasn't going to take the
chance" (of going through the picket line) ( 122). When
asked if he knew whether there would have been any
threats of violence if he did go through the picket line,
Jfr. Sutton attempted to go into what had happened
in the past (122) in dealing with others. This is not
material here. lie was basing his objection to the pickets, not because of what they had done or said, but upon
his presumption of what might happen because of some
unpleasant experiences in the past with others (122).
~'.

~lr. Sutton testified that each time he was stopped,
he was told by the pickets that they thought it would
he better if he joined the union and made it a union mine
(12:3). He discussed this matter with the pickets at son1e
length when he stopped (123). This evidence shows that
the picketing had for its J>Urpose peaceful persuasion.
The men tried to persuade Mr. Sutton by orderly conversation that it would be to his advantage and to the
advantage of the other plaintiffs if he unionized the
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m1ne. Mr. Sutton testified that this was the general
conversation each time he stopped and talked to the
pickets. This fact, coupled with his testimony above to
the effect that he was not threatened with bodily harm
by the pickets, corroborate defendants' position that the
picketing was peaceful and was formed to induce, by
lawful persuasion, the unionization of said mine.
nir. Sutton also testified to the effect that there was
no use going up there (to the mine) after the first times
as long as the picket line was there (123). Sutton told
Frank Steiningar not to "buck" the picket line (382).
Sutton sent Steining.ar up in the first place (on February
23, 1956) because he thought there would be no picket
line that day (382). Sutton stated he expected Steiningar
to turn around and con1e back if there was a picket line
(382). Sutton further stated that he did not intend to
work the mine as long as there was a picket line, because
of aJiticipated trouble based upon presun1ption and not
upon anything which actually happened at the picket
line (384, lines 1-8).
The above testunony of both Odendahl and plaintiff
Sutton substantiates the proposition that neither had
an~·

intention of crossing the picket line frmn the very

beginning: that they both feared picket lines generally.
Both .advised their en1ployees and partners respectively
not to eross or "buck .. the picket line. It was not Sutton's
intPntion to opPratl' or haul coal while the picket Hne was
on duty a:-; aforPsaid. The ven~ existence of the picket
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n'

line \Vas sufficient restraint as far as plaintiff Sutton
and his associa;tes were concerned.

In International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Board (115 Utah
183), 203 P. 2d 404, this Court held that otherwise lawful
picketing was not made unlawful in spite of the mental
reactions laboring men generally have regarding picket
lines and their tendency to respect it. The Court, after
citation of nu1nerous authorities, held the picketing involved was an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed
free speech.
~o

threats or violence were necessary under the

circumstances herein. No coal was hauled or was attempted to be hauled during the picketing. The mine was
shut down from the commencement of the picketing
pending settle1nent of the dispute. Plaintiffs made trips
to the n1ine for the purpose of inspecting the property
and not for producing coal ( 12:3). The mere presence
of the pickets from the time the planitiffs took over the
mine was the reason for the 8hut down and not on account of any words or acts by the pickets.
Under the above circumstances the question arises
what is the materiality of what the pickets said or did
as long as plaintiffs did not intend to operate or cross
the picket line in any event 1 l\1 r. Sutton has told us that
he was not going to take the chance of crossing the picket
line as long as the pickets were present.
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The issue here is not whether the picketing wa~
peaceful or otherwise. The real objection of the plaintiffs
was to any picketing whatsoever. In all their pleadings
they have asked the court to enjoin all picketing.
We submit that the evidence in this case does not
support a finding that the picketing was unlawful. However, to reverse this case, this Court need not go this
far. This is an equity case and on appeal the Supreme
Court n1ay examine the evidence and determine whether
or not the findings and judgment are against the weight
of the evidence. If this court should be of the cpinion
that the findings are against the weight of the evidence,
it should then make findings of its own and enter a
judg1nent in accordance therewith. Certainly the testiInony in this case clearly preponderates in favor of the
defendants. The evidence establishes by a preponderance
that the defendants were engaged in excercising their
right to picket, to inforn1 the public of their position, and
were attempting to persuade the plaintiffs to unionize
their 1nine. rnder the authorities this court in such a
~ituation should 1nake its ow'!l findings and enter a judgment in favor of the defendants herein.

Corey u. Roberts, S~ Utah 4-l-5. ~5 P. ~d 940: Transfer
Rt'a11,1! Co. r. Litchfield. S-t l~tah 163, 33 P. ~d 179 (Rehearing denied S5 r-tah -l-51. 39 P. ~d 752): Greco r.
Ontko, S!l lTtah ~-l-1. 39 P. :2d 318: Chapman r. Troy
!Jtn111dr.11 ('o .. S7 Utah 15, -l-7 P. 2d 1054: ChrisfPnson r.

X if'!snu. SS t Ttah 336, 54 P. 2d 430: Skala
91 Utah

~!l:~,

(i-t P.

~d

'l: •

.l/ errill.

lS!l.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'!"·

42
POINT IV
PEACEFUL PICKE'T1NG IS THE LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PURPOSE THEREOF IS TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS WHO
OPERATE WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP TO JOIN UNION.

fn Cafeteria Ernployees Union v. Angelos, supra,
plaintiffs owned and operated a cafeteria as partners
without the aid of any employees. The defendant labor
union picketed the cafeteria in an attempt to organize
it. A New York Court granted an injunction on the
grounds there was no "labor dispute" within the meaning
of the New York Anti-Injunction Act. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the judgment, stating at page 1:27 of
6-l: S. Ct.:
"But, as we have heretofore decided, a state
cannot exclude working men in a particular industry from putting their case to the public in a
peaceful way 'by drawing the circle of econornic
competition . . . so small as to contain only an
employer and those directly employed by him.'
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 r. S.
at page 326, 61 S. Ct. at page 570, 85 L. Ed. 855,
Cf. Bakery & Pa.stry Drivers Local v. W ohl, 315
U. H. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178."
In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S.
4-68, ;)7 N. Ct. 857, 81 L. F~d. 1229, .an action was brought
h:v Senn in the state court seeking an injunction to restrain picketing and partieularly publishing that the
plaintiff was unfair to organized labor and to the defendant unions, etc.. Senn eomplained that the union
pieketed his place of business and also sent letters to
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ize hirn because he was conducting a nonunion shop and
threatening to picket them if they did so. Senn was the
proprietor of a small business and he and his employees
declined to join the Tile Layers' Union. When he refused to sign a contract which barred him from working
at his trade with his employees, the union peacefully
picketed his pl~ace of business.
The state court denied an injunction under a Wisconsin statute allowing labor to use that form of economic pressure. He appealed to the U. S. Supreme
Court upon a contention that the statute of \Yisconsin
abridged his right under the Fourteenth .Amendment to
work under conditions of his own choice. The lT. S.
Supreme Court affirmed the judgrnent.
The unions in the Senn case conceded that Senn, so
long as he conducts a nonunion shop, has the right to
work with his hands and tools, and that he may do so,
a:-; freely as he 1nay work his e1nployees longer hours
and at lower wages than the union rules permit. But the
unions contended that since Senn 's excercise of the right
to do so was hannful to the interest of their nwmbers,
the~· rnay seek hy legal rneans to induce him to agree to
unionize his shop and to refrain frmn excercising his
right to work with his own hands. The Suprerne Court
of' \\'is<·onsin held that both the rneans ernployed and the
pnd:-; sought b~· the unions were legal under its law.
The question the Supreme Court of the United States
was nskPd to dt\eide was whether either the nwans or
1lt<' ends sought were forbidden by the federal constitution. The h ighPst court in the land held that the rneans
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which the state statute authorizes, to-wit: picketing and
publicity, were not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court then stated :
":Members of a union might, without special
statutory .authorization by a state, make known
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech
is guaranteed by the Feder.al Constitution. The
state may, in the exercise of its police power,
regulate the methods and means of publicity as
well as the use of public streets. If the end sought
by the unions is not forbidden by the Federal
Constitution, the state may authorize working
men to seek to attain it by combining as pickets,
just as it permits capitalists and employers to
combine in other ways to attain their desired
economic ends."
The Supreme Court said further in the Senn case :
"There is nothing in the Federal Constitution
which forbids unions from competing with nonunion concerns for customers by means of picketing as freely as one merchant competes with
another by means of advertisernents in the press,
by circulars, or by his window display. Each
member of the unions, as well as Senn, has the
right to strive to earn his living. Senn seeks to
do so through exercise of his individual skill and
planning. The union members seek to do so
through cornbination. Earning a living is dependent upon securing work; and securing work
is dependent upon public favor. To win the
patronage of the public each may strive h.v legal
means. Exercising its police power, Wisconsin
has declared that in a labor dispnt<>, peaceful
picketing and truthful publicity are means legal
for unions. It is true that disclosure of the facts
of the labor dispute may be annoying to Senn
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even if the method and means employed in giving
the publicity are inherently unobjectionable. But
such annoyance, like that often suffered from
publicity and other connections, is not an invasion
of the liberty guaranteed by the constitution.
Compare Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. United
States R. Labor Board, 261 r.S. 72, 43 S. Ct. 278,
67 L. Ed. 536. It is true, also, that disclosure
of the facts n1ay prevent Senn from securing jobs
which he hoped to get. But a hoped-for job if:
not property guaranteed by the Constitution. And
the diversion of it to a competitor is not invasion
of a constitutional right."
In Bakery and P. Drirers Local

'C.

TV old (1942), 315

F. S., 769 G:2 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178, the Supreme
Court held that to enjoin a labor unio:-.1 frmn peacefully
picketing independent or '"peddler" distributors of bakery products, who perfonned all their own work and
haYe no

emplo~·ees,

for the purpose of securing employ-

ment for union members, was to unconstitutionally infringe upon the right of free speech guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution, and further:
"So far as we can ascertain frmn the opinions
delivered frmn the state courts in this case, those
courts were concerned only with the question
whether there was involYed a labor dispute within the meaning of the X ew York statutes and
assumed the legality of the injunction followed
from a determination that such a dispute wa::'
not involved. Of course, that does not follow:
one need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by·
~tate law to have .a right under the Fourteenth
Anwndment to express a grievance in a labor
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n1atter by publication unattended by violence,
coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive."
See also Angelos v. 1l!lesevich, 289 N. Y. 498, 46 N.E.
2d 903; Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors Union, 315
Ill. App. 328, 43 N. E. 2d 198; Coons v. J mtrneymen
Barbers, 222 Minn. 100, 23 N. W. 2d, 345; Lo Bianco
v. Holt, 189 Misc. 113, 70 N.Y.S. 2d 33; Kellar v. Sttn,
93 N. Y. 2d 165.
I also wish to direct the court's at~tention to the
following authorities on the general status of peaceful
picketing as related to the constitutional guarantee of
free speech :

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Carlson v. Cal310 U. S .., 106; State of Washington ex rel Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Superior Court, 164 P. 2d
662; 1Vlilk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm
Products, 311 U. S. 91, 61 S. Ct. 122, 85 L. Ed. 63; U.S.
v. Iiutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788;
In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, .184 P. 2d 892.
~i.fornia,

Plaintiffs' ground this action upon the Utah Right
to Work Act. Their position, in brief, is to the effect
that said Act guarantees the plaintiffs the right to work
without becoming members of any union and defendants
by picketing are seeking to deny the plaintiffs their
rights under said Act. IIowever, the Utah Right to
Work Act exempts peaceful persuasion, which according
to the defendants, is what they were engaged jn doing
when enjoined by the trial court. The California SuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47
preme Court, in Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155
P. 2d 343, stated as follows about the right to work:
''The right to work, either in emploVlnent or
independent business, is fundamental"' and, no
doubt, enjoys the protection of the personal liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution, as well as the more
specific provisions of our state constitution.
. . . . but this right, like othe:r:s equally fundamental, is not absolute. It is safeguarded from
legislative action which discriminates against a
person or class of persons in respect to opportunities to obtain work or enter into business.
(Yick 'Yo Hopkins, 118 r. S. 356, 6 S .Ct. 1064,
30 L. Ed. 220: Abe v. Fish and Game Commission,
9 Cal. App. 2d 300, 49 P. 2d 608); and it is als~
protected in some degree against arbitrary action
by private organizations, including employr·rs and
labor unions. J mnes v. :Jiarinship Corp., supra.
But it is subject to n1any legislati-ve restrictions
fmniliar to all. such as statutorv limitations on
working hours~ nlinin1un1 wages: .age limits for
employment, licensing acts. safety regulations,
and a host of others. It is equally subJect to
peaceful economic pressure by labor m·ganizations
seeking 1e_qitimate euds, such as conditions of
1rork, co1lediz'e rather than indiridual bargaining,
seniority pri r i1e,ncs and other methods of adraHr('mnd, aud tlle union or closed shop ... :''
(Citing- eaf'es). (~fv emphasis).
In connection with the Right to "~ork Art, defendants wish to point out that five of their Ineinbers were
denied tlw right to work when they 'vere not permitted
to n•tnrn to their jobf' h~· reason of their wish to organize
tlw 1nine at which the~· had been eu1ployed and which
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is involved herein and that they were repeatedly told
that if they joined the union the mine would have to
shut down and there would be no work for them.
The defendants herein sought legitimate ends in
that they were picketing for recognition of the union to
which they wished to attach themselves and were exercising the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7
of the Taft Hartley Act and Utah Labor Statutes as
aforesaid. They had a right even under the: Utah Right
to Work Act to use peaceful persuasion to accomplish
these ends. We have heretofore noted that their conduct
\\·as not violent and, therefore, they were acting within
their rights under the Utah Right to Work Act.
Defendants firmly believe that the court erred in
restraining all picketing and that the court should not
have restrained picketing which was lawful and peaceful.
Of necessity, by restraining all picketing, the Court did
restrain peaceful and lawful picketing, which .are included in the term all picketing. If in fact the picketing
herein was violent, the Court should have restrained
those specific acts constituting the violence rather than
in sweeping tenns enjoining all picketing. See Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch 348 U. S. 480; Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union etc. v. ill eadowmoor Dairies, supra.

t

Note that in the Meadow1noor case the acts of
violence were of great magnitude and continuing. The
master who investigated for the Court found that there
had been violence on a considerable scale. Witnesses
testified to more than fifty instances of window smashSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing; explosive bombs causing substantial injury to plants;
stench bombs dropped in five stores; three trucks of
vendors were wrecked; and a store was set on fire. In
the course of· its opinion, the Court said, "These acts of
violence are not episodic nor isolated:' The Court also
said: "And so the right of free speech cannQt be denied
by drawing from a trivial rough incident or a moment of
animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the taint of forc-e."
In the Anheuser-Busch case, supra, the r.S. Supreme Court said that the picketing involved therein
did not preclude the conclusion that the transportation
was stopped for fear of crossing an otherwise peaceful
picket line and that in any ·event the state court enjoined
all picketing. The case was reversed and re1nanded and
we feel that the conclusions hereinabove cited from said
case apply with equal force to the case at bar.
Defendants are finnly of the opinion that the Court
in this ease, even if it disregarded the proposition that
the plaintiffs did not cross the picket line because of
fear of what nlight or could happen rather than any conduct on the part of the pickets. still should have enjoined
only such act~ as it found frmn the evidence to be violent
or in the nature of threats and should not have enjoined
in its permanent injunction all picketing which prevented
the defendant~ from exercising tlwir right under the Taft
llartlt'~· Ad, the Utah Labor Statutes aboye ci.ted, including the ·utah Right to "\rork Art, to engage in peaceful piekPting for organizational and other lawful labor
pnrpOSPS.
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CONCLUSION
Peaceful and lawful picketing is a right which is
secured to citizens of this country by the constitutional
provisions prot·e:cting freedmn of speech. We believe
that the findings and judgment of the trial court have
denied to defendants this very important right. These
defendants have been prohibited by the trial court from
engaging in any type of picketing. On the very face of
the judgment it appears that the court has violated de,..
fendants' rights. It enjoins the defendants from "all
picketing."
In the first place this case should not have been
considered by the courts of this state. Plaintiffs are engaged in interstate commerce and Congress has created
a tribunal to take care of labor disputes such as the
present. The National Labor Relations Board is the
tribunal before which plaintiffs should have submitted
their cause, if any. Whether or not the National Labor
Relations Board would take cognizance of this case
is of no concern to the courts of the State of Utah.
We submit that this court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and direct that a judgment be
entered in favor of the defendants, thereby assuring
defendants of their right to peacefully picket, to inform the public of their cause .and to persuade the plaintiffs to unionize their mine.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD SHEYA
Counsel for Appellamts
Bonomo Building
Price, Utah
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